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ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION: STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY IN INDONESIA'S PUBLIC SECTOR

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Abstract

Corruption entrenched within Indonesia's bureaucracy reflects the failure of Administrative Law (HAN) to effectively deter abuse of power. This study aims to analyze the role of HAN in promoting equitable and corruption-free administrative governance. Drawing on theories of structural inequality, good governance, and administrative law, this research adopts a descriptive qualitative approach through literature review and thematic analysis of secondary data. Findings reveal that weak HAN enforcement, overlapping regulations, and ineffective internal oversight bodies such as APIP create major gaps for systemic corruption. The study underscores the urgency of regulatory harmonization, oversight capacity-building, and digital integration in public administration. It concludes that HAN should not remain a symbolic framework but must function as a key instrument for bureaucratic reform toward a transparent and accountable government. Institutional restructuring and embedding integrity values across administrative systems are critical recommendations for combating governance disparities and corruption.
Keywords: Corruption, Administrative Law, Structural Inequality

A. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia, as a constitutional state (rechtstaat) governed by the 1945 Constitution, upholds the principles of justice, transparency, and accountability as the foundation of its public administration. However, the reality within the bureaucracy often diverges from these normative ideals. In practice, administrative structures have become fertile ground for systemic corruption. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International in 2020 reported a decline in Indonesia's score from 40 in 2019 to 37 in 2020, reflecting the weakening effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts (Cahyani & Ramadhani, 2023). This deterioration highlights the failure of administrative law mechanisms to act as effective checks on the abuse of power.

Corruption in Indonesia is not merely a financial crime; it undermines the institutional integrity of the state and erodes public trust in government. According to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), over 1,300 corruption cases involving public officials were recorded between 2004 and 2022. High-profile cases, such as the Surya Darmadi scandal which cost the state up to IDR 78 trillion, illustrate how weak bureaucratic oversight continues to allow large-scale misuse of authority (Arifin et al., 2022). This situation is exacerbated by the insufficient enforcement of good governance principles within public institutions principles that should serve as the cornerstone of administrative discipline and accountability (Kardina & Frinaldi, 2023).

These phenomena reflect deep structural inequality in Indonesia's administrative governance. Administrative law (Hukum Administrasi Negara, HAN), which should function as a legal framework to regulate public authority and ensure the rule of law, remains

underutilized and inconsistently applied. Many public policies are formulated to benefit specific elites rather than uphold principles of legality and public interest (Abhinaya & Jennifer, 2023). Public services remain inefficient, discriminatory, and lacking legal certainty symptoms of a governance system that fails to embed administrative justice. As Van Klink and Taekema (2019) argue, when public administration departs from legality and fairness, it creates opportunities for closed, unchecked systems of power that are resistant to democratic scrutiny.

Research by Arifin et al. (2022) demonstrates that abuse of authority in public policy frequently occurs due to weak administrative oversight mechanisms. Similarly, Kardina and Frinaldi (2023) emphasize the strategic role of administrative law (HAN) in bureaucratic reform, particularly in promoting institutional accountability and transparency. A study by Abhinaya and Jennifer (2023) reveals that the lack of internalization of good governance principles and the General Principles of Good Governance (AAUPB) leaves persistent gaps that facilitate corruption across various levels of government. Collectively, these studies highlight the importance of HAN in strengthening clean and effective governance.

This research aligns with the aforementioned studies in recognizing the urgency of HAN as a control mechanism for administrative supervision and corruption eradication. However, unlike previous research that tends to be normative-descriptive or evaluative in assessing the implementation of HAN in general, this article focuses on formulating a strategy for strengthening HAN in the context of structural inequality within Indonesia's bureaucracy. The study specifically examines the direct relationship between corruption practices and the failure of HAN functions within the governance system.

This distinctive approach underscores the article's originality, emphasizing that governance inequality is not solely caused by weak legal implementation but rather reflects deeper power imbalances permitted by the administrative structure. The article does not merely frame corruption as a consequence of personal ethics or moral failure among officials, but as a structural phenomenon rooted in the administrative design of HAN, which remains ineffective in deterring abuse of power. With this critical perspective, the article seeks to challenge the symbolic nature of past reform efforts and offer a more substantive framework for administrative law reform.

The urgency of this research lies in the pressing need to strengthen the structural design of HAN as the primary defense mechanism against systemic corruption in the bureaucracy. The proposed strategies include institutional authority reconstruction, the implementation of a closed system bureaucracy, and consistent internalization of good governance and AAUPB principles across all levels of government (Kardina & Frinaldi, 2023). In the context of Indonesia's ongoing struggle with abuse of power, reinforcing HAN is a critical step toward establishing a democratic and corruption-resistant governance system.

This research aims to examine the effectiveness of Indonesia's constitutional and judicial institutions specifically the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, Judicial Commission, and the House of Representatives in upholding the supremacy of law, by identifying institutional gaps that hinder consistent and accountable legal enforcement.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW
Theory of Administrative Law

Administrative Law (HAN) refers to the body of legal norms that govern the organization, duties, and oversight of public administration. It functions as a regulatory framework to ensure that public authorities act within the bounds of legality, fairness, and rationality. HAN serves both a preventive and corrective role against the misuse of public power. In democratic states, it acts as the legal backbone of bureaucratic accountability. When administrative law is weak or inconsistently applied, public policy tends to serve political elites rather than the public

interest (Van Klink & Taekema, 2019). Indicator:

- Legality of public decisions
- Administrative discretion control
- Availability of legal remedies for citizens
- Institutional clarity and separation of power
- Enforcement of the General Principles of Good Governance (AAUPB)

Structural Inequality Theory in Public Administration

Structural inequality theory examines how power imbalances within state institutions create persistent disparities in access, influence, and accountability. In public administration, this manifests through elite capture, institutional favoritism, and asymmetrical bureaucratic power. The theory emphasizes that corruption is not only a moral failure but a symptom of unequal governance structures. These inequalities are embedded in legal and organizational frameworks that privilege certain groups while marginalizing others. In Indonesia's case, administrative structures have become arenas of selective enforcement and uneven access to justice (Abhinaya & Jennifer, 2023). Indicator:

- Elite domination in policy formulation
- Selective law enforcement
- Unequal access to administrative justice
- Institutional capture and politicization
- Persistence of informal power networks

Good Governance Theory

The theory of good governance highlights the normative standards by which public administration should be evaluated, including accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and the rule of law. It provides a framework for limiting arbitrary power and fostering public trust in government institutions. In Indonesia, the failure to internalize these principles has contributed to administrative dysfunction and corruption. Good governance is not merely procedural but deeply institutional requiring integration into legal, bureaucratic, and cultural systems (Kardina & Frinaldi, 2023). The absence of these principles weakens institutional integrity and opens spaces for unchecked power. Indicator:

- Institutional transparency
- Accountability mechanisms
- Rule of law enforcement
- Public participation in decision-making
- Responsiveness to citizens' needs

C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study adopts a descriptive qualitative approach, aimed at understanding and explaining in depth the phenomenon of structural inequality in administrative governance and its relation to systemic corruption in Indonesia's public sector (Klassen et al., 2012). This approach is considered most relevant as it enables the exploration of complex relationships between weak oversight mechanisms, low bureaucratic integrity, and the abuse of power in administrative practices. The study is conceptual and exploratory in nature; it does not involve direct field observation but instead focuses on the collection and analysis of secondary data from credible academic and institutional literature sources (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

Data collection was conducted through library research, involving the review of secondary sources such as peer-reviewed journal articles, academic textbooks, official reports from state and anti-corruption bodies (e.g., KPK, BPK, Ombudsman), legal and regulatory frameworks, and relevant media publications. Additional data were drawn from public policy debates on social media, investigative reports, and official documents concerning bureaucratic structures

ARTIKEL

and governance policies in Indonesia. The analytical framework of the study relies on three key theoretical lenses: the theory of good governance (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008), institutional integrity theory (Huberts, 2014), and the concept of abuse of authority within administrative law (Van Klink & Taekema, 2019).

Data analysis was conducted using thematic analysis, identifying patterns, categories, and dominant issues from the collected texts and documents (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The study focuses on three main variables: (1) Administrative governance, defined as the mechanisms of public management based on transparency, accountability, and participation; (2) Corruption, understood as the misuse of authority for personal or group gain; and (3) Structural inequality, referring to the mismatch between normative ideals of governance and the actual practices of bureaucracy. To ensure the validity of the findings, source triangulation was employed by comparing data from diverse references to obtain consistent and confirmatory insights (Patton, 1999). Through this approach, the study seeks to contribute both conceptually and practically to the design of administrative reform strategies oriented toward institutional justice and anti-corruption efforts.

D. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Structural Inequality in Administrative Governance

The disparity in Indonesia's administrative governance reflects a systemic gap between the normative ideals of Administrative Law (Hukum Administrasi Negara/HAN) and the real-world practices of public bureaucracy (Fatoni, 2023). While HAN, in theory, serves as a legal framework to regulate authority, ensure legality of public actions, and uphold institutional accountability and transparency, its practical implementation has been repeatedly undermined. Saputra (2019) highlights that persistent violations of administrative norms are primarily caused by weak enforcement mechanisms. This includes overlapping regulations, ineffective internal audit institutions like APIP, and a bureaucratic culture that tolerates deviations. Such governance deficiencies are evident not only at the central level but also in decentralized regions, where insufficient oversight has led to a surge in corruption cases. High-profile scandals such as the e-KTP corruption, misuse of social assistance funds, and the sale of government positions are emblematic of how weak administrative controls and poor accountability mechanisms foster systemic abuse of power (Jamilah et al., 2025).

Recent empirical data supports these observations. According to Akbarani and Muzzammil (2023), Indonesia's declining Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score combined with recurring audit findings by the BPK and KPK regarding budget leakages strongly indicates that the administrative oversight framework is underperforming. This underscores the urgency of strengthening HAN not merely as a legal tool, but as an institutional pillar for clean and democratic governance. Strategic measures such as regulatory harmonization, capacity building for oversight bodies, and the integration of digital governance tools (e.g., e-budgeting, e-procurement) are critical steps toward addressing these inequalities. In addition, Sadhana (2010) argues that long-term reform must involve the internalization of good governance principles, implementation of merit-based civil service systems, and the active participation of civil society in monitoring government performance. Only by transforming HAN from a symbolic framework into a living instrument of institutional integrity can Indonesia hope to dismantle structural inequality and build a transparent, accountable, and corruption-resistant public sector.

Patterns and Modes of Corruption in Public Administration

One of the fundamental obstacles to achieving fair and efficient public administrative governance lies in the persistence of deeply entrenched corruption, particularly within the fiscal system. Corruption not only undermines the effectiveness of redistributive policies but also

exacerbates socio-economic inequality across different population groups. As highlighted by Engkus et al. (2022), several recurring patterns of corruption in fiscal administration are prevalent in many developing countries, including Indonesia. These patterns reflect systemic weaknesses in administrative enforcement, institutional transparency, and political accountability.

Budget Leakage and Inefficient Public Spending

A major form of corruption is the diversion of funds allocated for essential public services such as education, healthcare, and social protection. Bureaucratic corruption causes significant budget leakage, disproportionately affecting vulnerable communities. As noted by Engkus et al. (2022), "High levels of corruption and poor public expenditure management often lead to significant budget leakages." Consequently, public spending fails to fulfill its redistributive goals, leaving marginalized groups in persistent poverty while distorting the equity objectives of fiscal policy.

Policy Capture by Political and Economic Elites

Another prominent mode involves elite interference in fiscal policy-making. Public policies particularly in taxation and expenditure are shaped to benefit politically connected groups at the expense of public interest. This results in a skewed fiscal structure that favors the affluent and entrenches inequality. As observed by Naufal Ridha et al. (2022), "In highly corrupt countries, fiscal policies tend to benefit elite groups, thereby worsening income inequality." This pattern not only undermines distributive justice but also erodes public trust in government institutions.

Corruption in Tax Administration

The tax system is also highly vulnerable to manipulation. Practices such as falsification of tax records, bribery for reduced tax liabilities, and weak internal controls are commonly reported. Butarbutar (2017) emphasizes that "An inefficient and corrupt tax administration system reduces state revenue critical for social spending." These practices not only lower the government's capacity to fund poverty alleviation programs but also shift the tax burden unfairly, disproportionately affecting small businesses and low-income earners.

Lack of Fiscal Transparency and Accountability

Finally, the absence of transparent budgeting processes, weak financial reporting, and ineffective public audit mechanisms create a conducive environment for corruption. When fiscal oversight institutions are compromised, the misappropriation of public funds becomes difficult to detect and prosecute. As a result, fiscal policies fail to target the poor effectively, and poverty reduction programs often fall short of their objectives.

Weakness of Administrative Law in Curbing Corruption in Indonesia

The endemic corruption in Indonesia's public sector is strongly correlated with the weakness of administrative law as a foundational framework for governance. As a branch of public law, administrative law is intended to regulate the actions of public officials, define the scope of authority, and ensure accountability in decision-making. However, as Fanani & Zamroni (2018) assert, Indonesia's administrative law has often failed to serve as an effective deterrent to the abuse of power due to vague legal norms, fragmented regulations, and underperforming oversight institutions. These gaps create legal ambiguity that facilitates unauthorized and unaccountable conduct within the bureaucracy.

Prior to the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration, administrative norms were scattered across sectoral regulations, creating what Pudyatmoko & Aryadi (2021) call a "legal vacuum" in decision-making. In such an environment, officials often act beyond their authority under the justification that no specific regulation prohibits their behavior. This lack of legal clarity significantly increases the likelihood of power misuse, which is directly linked to corrupt practices in both central and local governments.

Furthermore, the inefficacy of internal oversight bodies such as the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP), as established under Government Regulation No. 60/2008 on the Government Internal Control System (SPIP), reveals another critical weakness. Despite being mandated to detect administrative violations at an early stage, APIP lacks both legal authority and operational independence to enforce meaningful sanctions or initiate recovery of state losses (Kardina & Frinaldi, 2023). Compounding this issue is the disconnection between administrative and criminal procedures—law enforcement agencies frequently bypass administrative mechanisms even in cases that begin as misuse of authority, contradicting Article 21 of Law No. 30/2014, which stipulates that administrative justice must precede criminal proceedings (Pusparini, 2020).

This structural disconnect is further evident at the regional government level. Muhtar et al. (2023) point to persistently weak internal control systems in budgeting, financial reporting, and institutional arrangements as key enablers of corruption. Data from the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) from 2010–2018 shows recurring administrative violations, underscoring the failure of administrative law to function as a preventive legal mechanism.

Lastly, the inability of administrative law to enforce core governance principles such as accountability, transparency, and the rule of law—further limits its role in corruption prevention. As Hidayat et al. (2020) argue, in the absence of legal requirements for accountability and enforcement, administrative law becomes symbolic rather than operational. This condition is reflected in Indonesia's persistently low Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which signals that legal frameworks remain inadequate to achieve substantial progress in combating corruption (Rolando et al., 2024).

The Gap Between Regulation and Practice in the Field

The gap between regulation and its implementation in practice remains a critical issue in the governance of Indonesia's public administration, especially in relation to corruption. Although well-formulated policies such as Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration exist, their execution on the ground often lacks consistency and commitment. Reform initiatives ranging from bureaucratic restructuring to digital service delivery frequently fail to address the root problem: a bureaucratic culture that is permissive of irregularities and resistant to accountability.

The function of administrative law, which should ideally prevent the abuse of power, is frequently undermined by weak legal norms, ineffective oversight institutions, and overlapping regulatory frameworks. Before the enactment of Law No. 30/2014, the absence of a clear administrative legal foundation created a legal vacuum, exploited by officials to act beyond their authority. Article 21 of the law specifically regulates the abuse of authority, yet its practical application is often neglected (Joni & Danil, 2023; Pudyatmoko & Aryadi, 2021).

The ineffectiveness of internal oversight bodies, especially the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP), exacerbates this situation. APIP has been widely criticized for lacking independence, human resources, and sufficient budgetary support, which limits its authority in detecting and addressing local-level administrative irregularities (Sulaiman, 2023). Case studies, such as in Musi Banyuasin Regency, show that APIP's probity audits are often delayed and merely procedural, rather than real-time or substantive, due to constraints in mandates, staffing, and document access (Septiani & Nurhayati, 2023).

Furthermore, the overlap between administrative and criminal legal authorities complicates the landscape. Law enforcement agencies tend to adopt criminal approaches without first exploring potential administrative violations, which by law should be adjudicated through the State Administrative Court (PTUN), in accordance with Article 21 of Law No. 30/2014. This misalignment fosters legal uncertainty and ultimately weakens corruption prevention efforts (Pudyatmoko & Aryadi, 2021). Weak internal control systems at the regional

government level also heighten corruption risks. Despite digitization in sectors like public procurement, reports from the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) show that corruption remains rampant, largely due to ineffective internal oversight mechanisms.

This condition is further exacerbated by the failure to apply core principles of good governance accountability, transparency, and rule of law within the framework of administrative law. When administrative systems do not compel officials to be answerable for their actions, accountability becomes non-existent. Preventive and punitive legal enforcement remains weak due to fragmented and unintegrated administrative and sectoral regulations, reducing administrative law to a symbolic instrument lacking real implementation power to deter or address corrupt behavior.

Strategies for Strengthening Administrative Law

Strengthening administrative law is an urgent necessity to prevent and comprehensively address corruption. Administrative law not only limits the authority of public officials but also serves as a corrective mechanism against maladministration and abuse of power. Therefore, a strategic approach to strengthening administrative law must focus on institutional and normative elements as well as collaborative efforts between law enforcement agencies and internal oversight bodies.

First, a key strategy is the reform and harmonization of administrative laws. This is especially important for clearly defining the boundaries of public officials' authority. Effective implementing regulations must supplement Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration to ensure compatibility with sectoral laws, including the Anti-Corruption Law. Often, disharmony between laws results in jurisdictional conflicts between administrative and criminal courts. This legal uncertainty undermines corruption prevention. Hence, synchronization must be achieved through mechanisms such as the omnibus law or comprehensive revisions of overlapping provisions (Hendrik et al., 2022).

Second, the roles of internal oversight institutions such as the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP) and the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) must be strengthened. As Zaid (2023) argues, APIP has not yet fully realized its strategic function as the frontline filter in corruption prevention due to its limited administrative authority. In many cases, APIP is not even involved in legal proceedings. Strengthening APIP's authority should go hand in hand with the provision of competent, independent human resources and sufficient power to issue binding follow-up recommendations and enforce administrative corrections.

Third, enhancing administrative law must also focus on improving financial transparency and internal controls. Muhtar et al. (2023) note that many corruption cases in regional governments stem from weak internal control systems, particularly in budget management, financial reporting, and institutional structuring. Therefore, a risk-based internal control system must be implemented, complete with measurable performance indicators and real-time auditing mechanisms. To ensure transparency and reduce the potential for data manipulation, these reforms should be supported by the integration of information technology through systems such as e-audit, e-planning, and e-budgeting.

Fourth, a critical component of strengthening administrative law is the firm establishment of principles of accountability and administrative responsibility. A criminal law approach should serve as a last resort, applied only after administrative remedies have been exhausted. In other words, not every deviation by public officials should immediately trigger criminal proceedings; instead, administrative correction mechanisms—such as those provided by APIP—should be prioritized, in accordance with Articles 20 and 21 of the Government Administration Law. This method offers a more efficient resolution of state losses without

resorting to costly and protracted legal processes (Elbouzidi et al., 2024).

Fifth, improving the capacity of administrative law in combating corruption also requires strengthening the human resources within the bureaucracy, oversight institutions, and law enforcement agencies. Public officials must be equipped with a clear understanding of integrity, ethical standards, and the principles of administrative governance. Administrative law education should be mandatory, along with routine ethical evaluations and audits for strategic-level decision-makers (Silalahi, 2022).

Finally, these efforts demand strong political will and institutional courage to enforce the law fairly. The central government must lead by example in enhancing oversight functions and refraining from interfering with administrative legal processes in strategic cases. Furthermore, it is essential to promote public participation in overseeing government administration through accessible and responsive citizen complaint mechanisms (Jahja et al., 2023).

Implications for Anti-Corruption Efforts

The strengthening of Administrative Law (Hukum Administrasi Negara – HAN) holds strategic implications for supporting anti-corruption agendas. HAN is not merely a set of norms and procedures, but also embodies the value system and principles of good governance. In the context of anti-corruption efforts, administrative law acts as a safeguard system that minimizes the potential for abuse of power. These implications are not isolated; rather, they reinforce one another, including the following:

First, it enhances bureaucratic accountability and transparency. Accountability requires that every public official must be responsible for administrative decisions and actions. Through the reinforcement of HAN, the structure of accountability becomes clearer. For instance, in procurement processes, strict administrative procedures ensure that each stage is documented and auditable. Transparency is also bolstered through mandatory documentation, information disclosure, and public engagement. A good example is the implementation of e-governance systems such as *e-budgeting* in Jakarta, which has significantly reduced the risk of budget misuse by allowing public access to financial documents. This clarity of responsibility facilitates oversight by institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Audit Board (BPK), or the Ombudsman in tracing decision-making processes, thereby minimizing embezzlement or data manipulation (Engkus & Pitaloka, 2023).

Second, it narrows the space for abuse of authority. In many corruption cases in Indonesia, the root problem lies in ambiguous boundaries of authority and weak control over government operations. Administrative law limits the discretionary power of public officials through principles such as legality, proportionality, and appropriateness. This means that all administrative actions must be legally grounded, purpose-driven, and within prescribed limits. For example, in licensing processes, the absence of strict administrative regulations allows officials to abuse their power by setting unofficial fees or delaying services in exchange for bribes. When HAN is enforced, such opportunities diminish, as every process becomes subject to legal scrutiny and judicial review.

Third, it increases public trust in government. Corruption directly erodes public confidence in state institutions. When public services are perceived as unfair, slow, or riddled with extortion, social trust declines. The strengthening of HAN creates a consistent, rule-based public service framework that provides legal certainty. For example, in issuing electronic ID cards or business permits, a law-based administrative system ensures procedures are conducted in accordance with accessible and standardized regulations. This boosts public perception that the government exists to serve, not obstruct. High public trust forms the foundation for social stability and state legitimacy (Kardina & Frinaldi, 2023).

Fourth, it promotes professionalism and a merit-based system within the civil service. A major source of corruption in bureaucracy stems from nepotism and political patronage in the

appointment of officials. HAN encourages the implementation of a merit system, where individuals are placed in positions based on qualifications, competence, and performance not on personal or political ties. This reduces the pressure on officials to return favors, which often opens the door to corruption. According to Engkus & Pitaloka (2023), the widespread practice of transactional job promotions at the regional level can be curbed if HAN is strictly applied in human resource management.

Fifth, it supports fair and efficient public service delivery. One indicator of successful anti-corruption efforts is improved public service quality. HAN offers a clear legal framework outlining the flow, requirements, timelines, and costs of services. Without such standards, many services become breeding grounds for bribery. For example, licensing processes for MSMEs are often slow and opaque, which encourages informal payments. Strong administrative law compels local governments to deliver timely, measurable, and accountable services improving both efficiency and reducing corrupt practices.

Sixth, it provides a strong legal basis for ethical enforcement and disciplinary action. HAN establishes the formal authority to impose administrative sanctions on civil servants who violate ethical or disciplinary codes. Without this foundation, violations are often tolerated or addressed informally. With formal mechanisms such as internal inspections or ethics councils public officials can be dealt with transparently and objectively. For example, an official found to have misused travel allowances can be subject to salary deductions, demotion, or dismissal. Such deterrents are essential to embed an anti-corruption culture within public institutions.

Seventh, it reduces governance disparities between central and regional governments. HAN offers a standardized governance framework, including for sub-national administrations. In the era of decentralization, significant disparities persist between developed and underdeveloped regions, particularly in institutional capacity. Strengthening HAN allows the central government to establish minimum service standards, regulatory formats, and uniform monitoring systems. For example, the national implementation of the Regional Government Information System (SIPD) requires all local governments to input standardized budget, program, and performance data. This curbs local manipulation and ensures that regional governance remains aligned with national legal frameworks, avoiding transactional practices and fictitious projects (Suparman, 2020).

Lastly, it fosters an anti-corruption bureaucratic culture. Beyond law enforcement, HAN shapes organizational behavior and work ethics. When civil servants are accustomed to following procedures, respecting rules, and understanding the consequences of violations, a culture of integrity emerges. This organizational culture becomes a social barrier against misconduct even before legal action is needed. Institutions that emphasize administrative discipline early on such as the Ministry of Finance or Judicial Commission tend to have lower violation rates compared to those with lax internal controls. Though building this culture takes time, the strengthening of HAN is a critical and non-negotiable starting point.

E. CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of this study, it can be concluded that the governance gap within Indonesia's administrative system is primarily driven by the disconnect between the ideal norms of Administrative Law (HAN) and bureaucratic practices that tolerate deviations, ultimately weakening oversight mechanisms and creating significant opportunities for corruption at both central and regional levels. This research demonstrates that HAN plays a strategic role not only in regulating the legality and authority of public officials but also as a key instrument for building accountable, transparent, and professional bureaucracy. Accordingly, the research objective—to evaluate HAN's contribution to anti-corruption efforts—has been achieved, and the study's main contribution lies in reaffirming the

importance of HAN as a systemic foundation for strengthening anti-corruption governance, a dimension often neglected in bureaucratic reform discourse. Practically, it is recommended that executive and judicial institutions reinforce the implementation of HAN through regulatory harmonization, digitalization of administrative processes, and capacity-building of oversight bodies such as APIP and the Ombudsman. Future research may explore the practical implementation of HAN in specific sectors—such as public procurement or local public services—using case studies or institutional ethnography. The main limitation of this study is the lack of empirical data on bureaucrats' perceptions of HAN, which should be addressed in future investigations. Policy-wise, these findings underscore the need for administrative reform that positions HAN as the central framework for designing a more just, transparent, and adaptive system of public service and governmental oversight in the face of modern governance challenges.

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